Social Anthropology:
Comparative Studies of Society and Culture

How Might One Distinguish Better Ethnography from Worse

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'Could I read what I have written to the people about whom I have written without any fear or moral qualm about what I have said or done' (Dove 1999: pp2 [Whisson 1994: 2]).

There would not have been many hands up in the 19th Century and up to the middle part of the 20th Century to the above self-analytic poser. They would not have seen or felt any reason nor need to.

This essay is not concerned with theoretical contents, perspectives, orientations or scientific paradigms of ethnographic representations but rather on the moral dilemma that has plagued ethnographers as they battle to reconcile what they see and experience in the field with assumptions, based on 19th Century evolutionist ideas of the moral, aesthetic, intellectual and political superiority of the West. These assumptions have tended to create and sustain an 'otherness' of the ethnographic subject that even the best intentioned anthropologist has found difficult to remain immune. The often hypocritical underbelly have sometimes prompted scathing and sardonic remarks from some anthropologists, notably Goody who identified this hypocrisy in ethnographic representations that paradoxically aim at helping 'those we study – concern for whose welfare we parade like stigmata in front of students, readers and the general public' (Sanjek 1991: p611). For me none represents this parallel tendency more clearly than Malinowski, who in spite of protestations of grasping 'the native's point of view', the danger of misconceptions about the 'primitive' and his cautionary injunction that the 'primitive's' 'irrational beliefs and rites made sense when their use was appreciated,' (Kuper 1996: p25) still made notations in his diaries that belied any notions of empathy with his subject of study.

This is in sharp contrast to Evans-Pritchard, whose pronouncements about his ethnographic subject indicated an establishment of a 'common sphere' that culminated in an acceptance of his subject's ideological stance both publicly and privately.

In the second half of the 19th Century, Europeans perceived a revolutionary transition in their society. Thus sociologists or affiliated disciples began to define a new type of society. 'Marx defined a capitalist society emerging from a feudal society; Weber wrote about rationalisations, the bureaucratisations, the disenchantment of the old world; Tönnies about the move from community to association; Durkheim about the change from mechanical to organic forms of solidarity. (Kuper, 1988: p4). In evolutionary terms therefore, this new society superseded a 'traditional society behind which was a primitive or primeval society. This then became anthropologists' special subject – the study of this primitive society, the study of this antithesis from which the modern society had evolved. This primeval society had to be everything that the modern society was not – 'nomadic', ordered by blood ties, sexually promiscuous and communist. The modern man had also progressed mentally and even invented science. Unforgivably, the primitive man was unsophisticated, illogical and given to magic, (not of the abracadabra genre).

But how to study him interactively? Hitherto, some ethnographic 'snippets had been infiltrating via missionaries, ministering and giving spiritual succor to the heathen and savages in Africa, Asia, North and South America; explorers, ever in search of more colonies for their various motherland and district administrators in the tropics. As Kuper explains 'unsophisticated about theory but wise in local ways, the old Africa hand – submitted answers to the queries of the scholars (p32). From the 1890's however, professional anthropologists began to do fieldwork but still produced only facts for the sociologist or ethnologist, based in a university or museum, to insert in a comparative framework and produce explanations.

Malinowski changed all that, playing a central role during the 1920's in establishing credit for the field worker. According to Clifford, 'it now became a new fusion of general theory and empirical research, of cultural analysis with

ethnographic description' (1988: 26). The field worker – theorist replaced the older division between the man on the ground as it were, and the sociologist or anthropologist in the metropole. This heralded a new dawn for anthropological fieldwork, where, above all, empirical knowledge, an insiders view of a culture and participant observation would ensure 'good ethnography' (Ernest Gellner's words) based on a theory of functionalism, though Kuper explains that it was more of a functionalist revolution than a fully fledged theoretical formulation (p1).

To accumulate data for a good ethnographic representation, Malinowski developed a whole series of techniques of collecting and recording. First there was the method of 'statistic documentation by concrete evidence' where a series of synoptic charts at once summarized normative range of customs and associated practices, indicating connections between particular activities where they conflate. This systematic chart of activities was crucial and according to Kuper, Malinowski wrote 'indeed, the object of scientific training is to provide the empirical investigation with a mental chart, in accordance with which he can take his bearings and lay his course' (Kuper p14).

The second methodology for the collation of data was what he called 'imponderabilia' of everyday life, where rules of regularities of native custom must be 'supplemented by the observation of the manner in which they are carried out ensuring that the behaviour of the natives conflate with rules of the customs so exactly formulated by the ethnographer (Kuper p15).

The third is his 'corpus inscriptionum', a *collection* of ethnographic statements, folklore and narratives that reflects the psychic and collective moral consciousness of a group. These prescriptions which according to Kuper are self evident, 'reflect a perception of the systematic divergence between what people say about what they do, what they actually do, and what they think. This then enables the ethnographer to achieve his ultimate goal, which is never to loose

sight that he is, says Malinowski, ‘to grasp the native’s point of view, *his* relation to life, to realise *his* vision of *his* world’ (Kuper p15).

How to realise this noble aspiration? Adherents to these Malinowskian extortions should add to their arsenal, Lienhardt’s prescriptive ethnographic trajectory, astute ruminations about effective and more accurate ethnographic representations when he was writing about the Dinka of Southern Sudam ‘for among them, I had the experience of daily conversation, which enables one to discriminate, as we take for granted in the language into which we were born, between what people mean and what they say. Then one learns also what kind of questions, formulated in an alien mode of thought, might receive answers – but answers which, though grammatically, syntactically and even semantically plausible, do not represent, and may positively misrepresent indigenous and spontaneous interests and ideas’. (Carruthers et al 1985: p147).

To therefore grasp ‘the native’s point of view’ and to understand his world is to adhere to a cultural relativistic stance, where such differences that does exist between ethnographer and subject be ‘deserving of respect and understanding in their own terms’ (Barnard & Spencer 1996 (Whittaker, p478)). Where there have been centuries of assumptions of both intellectual and cultural superiority, what hope then that the western ethnographer can detach himself from this consciousness and take a comprehensive objective stance in his study of the world of his subject? Reading various ethnographic representations of cultures by Western ethnographers, the notion of ‘otherness’ is apparent no matter how cleverly disguised.

There is the Malinowskian representations that paternalistically disputes the primitivity of the savage ‘other’ – ‘one will be forced to recognise that while the ‘savage’ may be no more rational than ourselves, he is at least as reasonable, said Kuper, explaining a theme attributed to Malinowski’s monographs of the Trobriand Man. (Kuper 1996: p23). Tylor and Frazer, whilst not disputing that

the savages made some kind of sense, just worried about what kind of sense they made, with Tylor inclined to believe that the savage made perhaps some radically logical kind of sense. This prompted the ironic remark from Andrew Land 'we must even make allowance for the savage habit of pushing ideas to their logical conclusions, a habit which our English characteristics make us find difficult to understand. (Kuper 1996, p25). Furthering the case for cultural relativity, Malinowski insists that apparently irrational beliefs and rites made sense when their use was appreciated'. This, Kuper quotes him reiterating, that the 'savage' in his relation to nature and destiny the primitive man recognises both the natural and the supernatural forces and agencies, and he tries to use them both for his benefit (Kuper: 25).

Having constructed this benign and reflexive approach to ethnographic representations how faithfully did Malinowski or indeed latter disciples adhere to its ideological trajectory and rhetoric?

To realise the native's views of his world entails living some of his life and not just participating in certain relevant customs and ceremonies. To realise his vision would entail a doxic sterility and a Damascene conversion to all men being created equal. Since I am not trying to forge an utopian link here, suffice it to say that most ethnographic representations have fallen below this ideal of realizing 'the native's' life and vision. Hence Kuklick says of Malinowski, 'In the Trobriands, he was never very far from European pearl traders with whom he consorted when he found unbearable the company of the Islanders – frequently described in his diary as 'niggers'. In his diary he confided his 'feeling of ownership' as 'master of this village with my boys'. (Barnard & Spender 1996: pg 344). Although he demonstrably succeeded in his declared intention to 'take the native's point of view', often taking a protective attitude towards them in opposition to the colonial officials, missionaries and commercial agents who were determined to eradicate their way of life, (p344) (though these external influences were omitted in his monographs and for which neglect he apologised later on his

career) one still senses an inherent reticence to 'elevate' 'the native' to an equal status. The motto therefore for anthropology's army of ethnographers seems to be 'Be seen to be objective and empathetic' even if you believe otherwise in 'mufti' or the more succinct Igbo saying 'You may laud the industrious ant but shut the door on his petition for your daughter's hand'.

Western scholars would invariably find therefore that interpretations of the 'other' cultures become limited by feelings and assumptions taken into fieldwork from their own cultural experience. Thus Annette Wiener, during 1971 and 1972, and carrying out ten months research in a Trobriand village close to where Malinowski had worked fifty years earlier, was invited to, and witnessed a mortuary ceremony that left her with 'a sense of beauty' 'a feeling that to die in Kiriwina is much more humane that to die in a sterile hospital room' (Layton 1997: p188 [Weiner 1976: 63]). Of the same event Malinowski's diary revealed that he was revolted by the way that death was handled and Weiner assessed that this accounted for Malinowski's emphasis on 'the bizarre and "primitive" quality of rituals surrounding death in Trobriand funerals. (p188).

Nor did Radcliffe-Brown's ethnographic contribution on the Andamanese proffer much in realising the 'native's vision of his world', having written about 'his world' in detention centres where 'the diseased Aborigines from many parts of Western Australia were sent forcibly in chains, segregated by sex and suffered high casualty rates'. (Sanjek 1991: 613). Without the experience of living amongst and engaging in participant observation, interpretation suffers, resulting in textually rich accounts with no life force as it were - 'For the understanding of cultural forms occurs only with an 'intense personal participation, an active at-homeness in a common universe'. (Clifford 1988: p34).

Malinowski may have tried to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life and to realise his vision of his world but it was a vision as Malinowski chose to interpret it, dismissing customs as 'primitive' when it failed his western orientated

aesthetic barometer, and writing in disgust of ceremonies that lacked the authenticity that he wished. Thus his disgust at six urchins, who farewelled the 'baloma' in his first essay on the Trobriands in 1916, pronouncing their performance undignified, their demeanor, 'of boys in the street, who perform some nuisance sanctioned by customs, like the proceedings on Guy Fawkes' day or similar occasions'. (Kuper 1996: p15).

It was only later, in an appendix to his final monograph on the Trobrianders, *Coral Gardens and their Magic* which appeared in 1935 that he acknowledged that some of the ceremonies he witnessed could have been affected by European influences, transforming the native's in the process, but more on this later.

On the other side of the world was Evans-Pritchard whose notable efforts to forge new links with his ethnographic subject constitutes for me, a better representation and therefore a better ethnography. Well aware of his culture, the climate of thought that he was born and brought up in,' (Pritchard: 1976 p244) his book aptly reads as if addressed to a sceptic world. In *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* of Central Sudan, amongst whom he did fieldwork between 1926-9, he tried to persuade a sceptic world only interested in studies that underpinned a variety of ideological positions, about the 'rationality' of Azande thought. Hence his poser 'Is Zande thought so different from ours that we can only describe their speech and actions without comprehending them or is it essentially like our own though expressed in a idiom to which we are unaccustomed?' (Kuper 1996: p74 [Pritchard 1937:4]). To comprehend one must have a 'thorough knowledge of the language of the people about whom he is going to tell us. By no other path can their thought be understood and presented' (Pritchard 1976: p251). His immersion into the culture of study also included living like they did 'I found it useful if I wanted to understand how and why Africans are doing certain things, to do them myself; I had a hut and byre like theirs; I went hunting with them with spear and bow and arrow; I learnt to make pots; I consulted oracles'. To illustrate he adds, 'if I wanted to go hunting or on a

journey, for instance, no one would willingly accompany me unless I was able to produce a verdict of the poison oracle (benge) (p243-4).

The Azande depended on these oracles in regulating everyday activities, and in cases involving witches, adulterers and so forth. It works like this. A special poison (*benge*: a red powder poison derived from a wild forest creeper) is given to a chicken after a question has been put to it. The answer is determined by the life or death of the chicken. Pritchard invites us to see these beliefs as reasonable and develops arguments to this effect. First he describes how easily he himself adopted these ways of thinking and acting, explaining 'I had no interest in witchcraft when I went to Zanderland but the Azande had: so I had to let myself be guided by them'. 'In their culture, in the set of ideas I then lived in, I accepted them: in a kind of way I believed them' (Pritchard 1976: p242, 244). Secondly these beliefs are not articulated in the abstract or arranged into developed theories but simply invoked piecemeal in specific situations. Thus the mystical agent of harm, in this instance, witchcraft, is invoked to provide at once an explanation of misfortune and a means of combating it. Hence when a man sitting in a shade beneath a granary is killed by the granary falling on him because its support had been gnawed away by termites, the Zande do not see the coincidence. Instead they ask 'why should it have collapsed at the particular time that this particular man was sitting underneath it?' The Azande explain it by witchcraft. The witchcraft and the granary, operating in concert, killed the man. Witchcraft thus explains the misfortune with the possibility of redress. The witch is identified through the oracle, punished and societal integrity is restored. Logical enough really.

Pritchard thus tried to make a powerful case for the internal coherence and rationality of apparently alien mode of thought, calling on the reader to be persuaded of one thing – 'namely the intellectual consistency of Zande notions. They only appear consistent when ranged like lifeless museum objects. When we see how an individual uses them, we may say that they are mystical but we cannot

say that his use of them is illogical. I had no difficulty in using Zande notions as Azande themselves use them. Once the idiom is learnt the rest is easy – as one common sense idea follows on another in our own society' (Kuper 1996 p78 [Pritchard 1937: 540]). I am not suggesting that Pritchard was immune from western paradigms and ideologies regarding the 'primitive'. After all, scattered within his monographs were references to 'primitives' and 'savages' and even towards the end of his life advocated a return to diffusionism, thus evoking the spectre of evolutionist notions, much to the chagrin of his colleagues (Barnard & Spencer 1996: p573). The point I am making however is that during and after his fieldwork with the Azande people on *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic*, there was *genuineness* about his demonstrable intention to make the reader understand the Azande thought, the Azande logic and rationality, as it were. To us now it seems so paternalistic, patronising even, but in his era, when most anthropology was in financial throes to colonial governments, the latter avidly and gleefully devouring literature that fed their ideological position on the primitive society, producing parallel repercussions that made colonisation guilt and conscience free, it was quite a bold stance. Although Malinowski's stance was similar, it seems to me, with the publication of his diaries in 1967, a hypocritical one.

While I perceive Pritchard's as genuine conviction, Malinowski's seem to be ambition-induced and motivated, in a bid to establish something academically new and different. In a culture where the perceived wisdom was that the inhabitants of designated 'primitive' societies were irrational, would it not be, in everyday parlance 'a poke in the eye' of the establishment and the world of academe to deploy his ethnography to make critical points against what he considered general or perhaps merely popular misconceptions? Thus 'his Trobriand Man was often set in a complex institutional context, but more often, he was summoned on parade to controvert, by his flesh and blood reality, some scholarly theory' (Kuper 1996: p23). As Pritchard stated (and Malinowski, most aware) 'Anyone who is not a complete idiot can do fieldwork – anyone can produce a new fact; *the thing is to produce a new idea'* (Pritchard 1976: p243).

Proof of the 'primitive's' schematic and 'rational' endeavors – the Kula – became therefore a coup.

Thus as ethnographic representations, Pritchard's *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* appears more credible though both were as detailed. In current thinking about ethnographic subject and object, one might dismiss Malinowski's diaries as just an inconsequential footnote but the repercussions may linger nonetheless. Whilst not being wholly nor solely responsible, it is perhaps contributory to non-western post-colonial writers, looking askance at western anthropology whose universalizing rhetoric of humanist anthropology thinly disguises the authority that western institutions and institutionalised forms of knowledge continue to exert over 'other' non-western cultures (Graham 1994: p1).

Debates have raged on for years and accusations of conspiratory theories denied. Yet, even the proffering of a universalizing rhetoric of humanist anthropology does not eradicate that suspicion of a 'Malinowskian diary', lurking underneath the floorboards of our intrepid ethnographer in the field, ready to bring us 'the native's point of view.'

But how to tell it? Much has been made of the 'ethnographic present' as a mode of presentation. Earlier and contemporary ethnographic representations have been adjudged worse or better according to how much of the 'ethnographic present' they took into account whilst writing.

According to Sanjek, there are two recent definitions. The first by Fabian (1983: 80) states that it is 'the practice of giving accounts of other cultures and societies in the present tense'. He is 'concerned with the artificiality and the freezing of time that descriptions in the present tense may impart, conveying none of the independence of rule and action experienced in the ethnographer's own world,

thus functioning to take the society so described, out of the time stream of history in which ethnographers and their own societies exist' (Sanjek 1991: p612).

The second definition by McKnight (1990: 58) is concerned with representations that depict 'the present which existed in the traditional past and not the period when the ethnographer was in the field. This pretence is that certain aspects of the present may be ignored, while the other aspects of the present be taken to represent traditional life – the way things were before white influence (in Africa and among the Australian Aborigines) but then written about in the present tense'. This results in what was ignored in earlier decades later becoming the new research agenda 'after it is too late' (Sanjek 1991, p612).

To the above charges, Malinowski and Pritchard had already pled mea culpa. Malinowski in his last Trobriand volume declared 'The Trobriander as he was – has become by now a thing of the past, to be reconstructed, not to be observed – He has become already a citizen of the world, is affected by contacts with the world-wide civilsation – I was not yet under [this point of view] in doing my fieldwork. This perhaps is the most serious shortcoming of my whole anthropological research in Melanesia (Sanjek 1991: p613 [Malinowski 1935, 1: pp480-1]). Echoing this sentiment Pritchard stated 'it had not occurred to me as clearly as it should have done, that the information we gathered and published, might some time or other be scrutinised and evaluated to some extent by the circumstances of one kind or another in which we conducted our research'. Acknowledging also the non-reflexivity of earlier anthropologists, he called attention to the late Dr. Nkrumah complaints *on how anthropologists tried to make the African look as primitive as possible: photographing people in the nude and writing about witchcraft and fetishes and other superstitions and ignoring roads, harbours, schools, factories etc.* (Pritchard 1976: p450).

Given the limited space and time of this essay, I shall refrain from extended polemics other than to proffer a cautionary fact: – this was a period in

anthropology when the ‘primitive society’ was the object of study. Evolutionist ideas, no matter how unpopular, were still the basis of this study. Various theoretical perspectives may have been used as tools for hermeneutic constructions – functionalism, structural functionalism, structuralism, and even as late as the 1980’s there was still debate over the degree to which ‘primitive peoples’ were culturally capable of rational thought’. (Barnard 2000: p208) If, therefore, as they saw it, modern society evolved from a primitive one, they would hardly be expected to travel to Africa and Australia (some of whom (anthropologists) had readily lent and sold themselves in the service of colonial interests’ (Pritchard 1976: p250) and return waving papers of egalitarianism!’. Moreover, these anthropologists did not grow up in a cultural vacuum. They were part of a culture that believed in the aesthetic, political and economic superiority of the West, and without even invoking Durkheim's social facts or Freud’s psycho-analysis, they would naturally have been affected by their environment. It is not any more strange than the post-colonial non-western, writers and scholars, being affected and loud in their protestations, about the brutality of colonization. Whilst not suggesting that all western anthropologists were thus constituted, it would behoove us to put things in perspective and realise that the majority were a product of their times, and understand and forgive their non-reflexivity though not forget their lessons.

However much one may bemoan, their non-reflexivity with all its attendant ills, we must also appreciate the academic wealth of these ethnographic records. Without them, I gingerly proffer (I don’t want to start another debate) that I would not have known nor possibly have heard of the Nuer, Tallensi, the Trobriand, the Azande and so forth, and in the knowledge being empowered to challenge and seek correction of mis-representations, as indeed most non-western anthropologists are now engaged.

Hence Graham’s discourse on creative writers from Africa and other parts of the post-colonial world, who have understandably been eager to ‘capitalize on the

contradictions in western (humanist) anthropology, permitting them to effect a critique of the ethnocentric attitudes underlying western studies of 'foreign cultures' and providing them with elite conceptual basis for a fictionalised ethnography of their own cultures.' (Graham 1994: p1). This is exaggerated perhaps, but there are a few of these 'saccharin ethnographic counter-representations' where everything is (to take a line from a popular song) 'sugar and spice and everything groovy'. An example is Uchendu's valiant effort on the ethnographic representation of the Igbo's of South East Nigeria. It reads more like a data of information than ethnography and like all such, there is a paucity of real explanations, interpretations and negative cultural aspects.

Here again ethnography of the present is sacrificed for ethnographic present, the very thing that western anthropologists are routinely accused of! As a result the negative effects of 'helping the town to get up' that hangs very heavily like an albatross on the neck of an Igbo is glossed over. The fact that the stress inflicted by this cultural burden on the Igbo, causing stress-related ill health and even death, is thoroughly ignored. As a culture bearer, I am aware of friends and relatives literally 'dropping dead' from over-work and stress in a bid to be a source of pride to the village, to help the town 'get up', to realise the goal of good citizenship, to become a man of prestige and an 'Okwu omee' – 'one who says and does (financially) what he says' (Uchendu 1965: p34).

Such 'saccharin' counter-representations do little to explode the myth or scrutinise the questionable or even fraudulent assumptions behind western descriptions of and inscriptions upon 'primitive' cultures. However, correcting long held erroneous stereotypes is almost a monolithic task that is not helped by non-western cultures enthusiastically embracing western influenced and global consumption of goods and culture, all the while hypocritically extolling the virtues of their cultures as the strategies developed by their political leaders to stay inserted in the capital world economic system becomes ever more violent.

All is not lost however. Dove, after his ethnographic role in the Dayak project in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, opined that 'one of the principal challenges for counter-discourses and representations is to avoid operating within the same discursive space and within the same field of power, of the dominant strategy.' Consequently empowering representations are constructed to actively contest disempowering representations by not coming up with different answers to the questions asked or stated by external critics, but by reforming these questions. Thus the Dayak turned their purported desire to 'return to the past' into a debate over their right to defend their culture, a debate over how to develop Dayak culture restated as a debate over acceptance of their culture (Dove 1999: p5-7).

Such strategies, effectively constructed and constituted could become effective tools to counter misrepresentations of ethnographic facts.

I have not tried in this essay to explore scientific permutations of what constitutes a worse or better ethnography but rather have tried to give it 'flesh and blood' as Pritchard once said, a 'human face'. For, in the *longue durée*, what makes a better ethnographic representation is not just prescribed recipees: academic validations, length of sojourn in the field, participant observation, theoretical perspectives and permutations and methodologies, all ensuring the ethnographer a recipient of academic accolades within the academic audience.

There is however a more important audience – the ethnographic audience. He is the final arbiter. He it is who gives the final 'nod' to the ethnographer's endeavours. When an ethnographer can read what he has written to his subject without any fear or moral qualms, when he can make his discourse not just intelligible but audible enough to call attention to the conditions afflicting his subject, then a configuration of a better ethnography begins to emerge.

Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard were pioneers and giants in their field. 'Argonauts' is a complex narrative, simultaneously of Trobriand life and

ethnographic fieldwork, establishing the scientific validity of participant observation. Pritchard's *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* is a classic. Given the opening quotation by Whisson of this essay, the 'natives point of view' was better represented by whoever established Dithley's 'common-sphere', 'a building up of a shared experiential world with the ethnographic subject and closely linked to effective interpretation of cultural knowledge. This can only be achieved by an intense personal participation, an active at-homeness in a common universe.' (Clifford 1988: p35-6). Pritchard demonstrates and exemplifies this exegesis by declaring after his ethnographic endeavours on both the Azande and the Nuer – 'I learnt from African 'primitives' much more than they learnt from me, much that I was never taught at school, something more of courage, endurance, patience, resignation and forbearance that I had no great understanding of before. Just to give one example: I would say that I have learnt more about the nature of God and our human predicament from the Nuer than I ever learnt at home' (Pritchard 1976: p245). Moreover he learnt to accept unpatronisingly the Azande beliefs for he asked '*why, other than in faith, should one accept God and not witchcraft, since it could be held, as many anthropologists do, that the evidence for one is no greater than for the other'* (p245).

As far as I am aware Malinowski never made any 'common sphere' declarations about the Australian Aborigines. With Malinowski, one gets a sense of a careless detachment from his subject of study that is not based on any notions of objectivity, examples of which I had stated earlier in this essay. Pritchard on the other hand embodies an 'at-homeness' with ethnographic subjects, inviting trust by both reader and native, in his demonstrable desire to 'grasp the natives point of view'. That formula and mode of exposition, for me is a solid basis for a better ethnography.

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